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the statute, his action took precedence 
over that of the eleven employees. Id, 107 
S.Ct. at 2212. The court rejected Fort 
Halifax's argument that the Maine statute 
was preempted by ERISA, holding that 
ERISA preempted only benefit plans creat-
ed by employers or employee organiza-
tions. Since this case involved a benefit 
plan which arose by operation of state law, 
ERISA did not apply and there was no 
preemption problem. 
The Supreme Court, while affirming the 
judgment of the Maine Supreme Judicial 
Court, rejected their rationale. Under the 
Maine court's analysis, states could set up 
benefit plans because only employers and 
employee organizations were barred by 
ERISA from doing so. What the Maine 
court· failed to recognize, however, was 
that such an analysis was in direct conflict 
with the Congressional purpose for enact-
ing ERISA. Congress wanted to establish a 
uniform set of administrative practices in 
dealing with employee benefits, thereby 
eliminating conflicting regulatory require-
ments. By allowing states to set up benefit 
plans sua sponte there could still be serious 
conflicts between state benefit plans and 
benefit plans provided for by ERISA. 
Recognizing the fallacy· of the lower 
court's reasoning, the Supreme Court took 
a different approach. The Court held that 
the Maine statute was valid because it nei-
ther established, nor required, employers 
to maintain an "employee benefit plan" as 
that phrase was interpreted by Congress. 
In so holding, the Court rejected Fort 
Halifax's principle argument that any state 
law which deals with an employee benefit 
listed in ERISA automatically regulates an 
employee benefit plan and is therefore 
preempted. 
The Court stated three reasons for its 
ruling. First, the Court decided that the 
plain language of ERISA is contrary to 
Fort Halifax's interpretation. The preemp-
tion provision of ERISA applies only to 
employee benefit plans, not employee ben-
efits. The Maine statute providing for sev-
erance pay gave employees a benefit but 
did not establish a benefit plan. The Maine 
statute requires no regulatory scheme or 
administrative programs that could be con-
strued as a "plan." It merely establishes a 
one-time payment conditioned upon the 
happening of a specific event. Id. at 2213. 
Second, the Court analyzed the legisla-
tive history and determined that Congress' 
principle purpose in enacting ERISA was 
to eliminate conflicting state and local 
regulations. Id. at 2216. Companies fre-
quently conduct business in many dif-
ferent cities and states, thus making 
compliance with state and local regulations 
both burdensome and inefficient. Byestab-
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lishing a system of federal regulations to 
control benefit plans, Congress hoped to 
make it easier for employers to do business 
while at the same time protecting the pen-
sion and benefit rights of employees. 
Examining the Maine statute in light of 
ERISA's purposes, it was clear to the 
Court that none of the Congressional con-
cerns were present in this case. Id. at 2213. 
Finally, the Court noted that another 
purpose of ERISA was to mandate disclo-
sure requirements, thus providing safe-
guards "with respect to the establishment, 
operation, and administration of 
(employee benefit) plans." 29 U.S.c. 
§1001(a) (1982). Since there were no 
administrative regulations or continuous 
activities involving a "plan" under the 
Maine statute, disclosure would be mean-
ingless and safeguards unneccessary. 
The Court's decision in Fort Halifax 
allows states to provide statutory benefits 
to employees as long as they require no 
continuous administration constituting a 
benefit plan. 
- Steven E. Sunday 
Emmert v. Hearn: "ALL MY 
PERSONAL PROPERTY" CLAUSE 
CONSTRUED TO ENCOMPASS 
TESTATOR'S TANGmLE AND 
INTANGmLE PERSONAL 
PROPERTY 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland in 
Emmert v. Hearn, 309 Md. 19, 522 A.2d 
377 (1987), held that a testator's intangible, 
as well as tangible, personal property pass-
ed to his surviving children under a para-
graph in a will that read: "I bequeath all 
my personal property to my surviving 
children." In so holding, the court of 
appeals affirmed the court of special 
appeals' reversal of the circuit court ruling. 
George Roberts, the testator, died in 
1981. He was survived by seven children. 
His wife had predeceased him eleven years 
prior, and a son had died in 1971, leaving 
one child. Roberts left a will (executed in 
1977) in which he bequeathed all of his 
personal property to his surviving children 
to be divided equally. 
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time of his death, was valued at approx-
imately $750,000. Inventories were med 
showing $425,000 in real property, $2,500 
in tangible personal property and $324,000 
in intangible personal property including 
stocks, bonds and bank accounts. 
Miriam E. Emmert was the designated 
personal representative of her father's 
estate. In this capacity, she filed a petition 
for declaratory relief in the Circuit Court 
for Carroll County. The petition alleged, 
among other things, that the phrase "per-
sonal property was ambiguous; that the 
testator's intention was to include only 
tangible personal property ... " Emmert '0. 
Hearn, 309 Md. at 21, 522 A.2d 377. 
The trial court concluded that a latent 
ambiguity existed as to whether the "per-
sonal property" referred to in the second 
provision of Roberts' will included tangi-
ble, as well as intangible, personal proper-
ty. Extrinsic evidence, including testimony 
by Emmert, one of the testator's children, 
and the deposition by the attorney who 
drafted the will, was admitted to "clear the 
ambiguity." Id. at 22, 522 A.2d at 379. 
From this testimony, it was gleaned that 
the intention of the testator was to include 
only tangible personal property in his 
second provision. The court held that the 
words "personal property," as used in the 
second provision of his will, applied to tan-
gible property only, and that the intangi-
ble personal property passed under 
another provision of the will into the inter 
vivos trust. 
In an unreported opinion, the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland reversed the 
circuit court judgment. It found that no 
ambiguity existed as to the words of the 
will; therefore, extrinsic evidence as to the 
intention of the testator should not have 
been permitted. According to the court of 
special appeals, the trial court was in error 
in admitting extrinsic evidence of the testa-
tor's intention. Certiorari was granted by 
the court of appeals to consider the impor-
tant question presented 307 Md. 163 
(1986). 
Upon review, the court of appeals 
applied a step-by-step analysis in constru-
ing the will. Ordinarily, the court said, the 
intent of a testator must be gathered from 
the four corners of the will, giving words 
their "plain meaning." In so doing, the 
court recognized that their foremost con-
cern was to ascertain the testator's express-
ed intent. However, the court stressed that 
"[e]xtrinsic evidence should not be admit-
ted to show that the testator meant some-
thing different from what his language 
imports .. , What he meant to say must be 
gathered from what he did say." Id. (quot-
ing Fersinger '0. Martin, 183 Md. 135, 138, 
36 A.2d 716 (1944». 
The court then looked to Webster's Dic-
tionary, as well as Black's Law Dictionary, 
to determine both the ordinary and the 
legal meaning of the term "personal prop-
erty." Both sources included intangible 
property in their definitions. Additionally, 
the court noted that bequests of personal 
property are generally to be construed 
broadly unless there is some indication in 
the will to the contrary. The court cited 
several cases where it had applied this gen-
eral rule. 
In Leroy '0. Kirk, 262 Md. 276, 283, 277 
A.2d 611 (1971), for example, the testator 
bequeathed "all of my personal property, 
including my automobile, boat and the 
contents of my house and outbuild-
ings .... " The listing of items put a restric-
tion on the term "personal property" and 
caused the court to limit, by example, the 
bequest to tangible personal property. 
Returning to the Roberts' will, the court 
found that nothing on the face of the will 
limited or qualified the bequest of personal 
property. No examples were given in the 
will for the purpose of illustration as to 
what the testator meant by personal prop-
erty. The court concluded that the will 
was unambiguous on its face. Further-
more, the court stated that a latent ambi-
guity did not exist in the provisions of the 
Roberts' will. H "the language of the will 
is plain and single, yet is found to apply 
equally to two or more subjct or objects 
then it would indicate latent ambiguity." 
Emmert, 309 Md. at 27,522 A.2d 377, 381. 
Extrinsic evidence would be admissible 
only to resolve an ambiguity. Id. Such 
extrinsic evidence might also indicate that 
the description in the will is defective. 
The court stated that there was no defec-
tive description in the will nor was there 
any indication that Roberts' bequest 
applied to two or more persons or things. 
Thus, "if the language of a will is clear 
and no latent ambiguity exists, the court's 
role in the construction of the will is at an 
end." Id. at 28, 522 A.2d at 382. There 
being no indication that the testator 
intended anything other than all of his per-
sonal property to pass under the second 
provision, the court held that the bequest 
in that paragraph was all-inclusive. 
The court cautioned that its holding 
would yield an unfair result to the grand-
children, especially to the son of the 
deceased child, but such "[A]n inequality 
cannot influence a court in its duty to find 
out what a testator meant by his will .... " 
Emmert, 309 Md. at 28, 522 A.2d 377 
. (quoting McCurdy '0. Safe Deposit & Trust 
Co., 190 Md. 67, 69, 57 A.2d 302, 303 
(1948». 
By its holding the court has once more 
underscored the important of specificity in 
the drafting of legal documents. Drafters 
of wills and other testamentary devices 
will take note to be as specific as possible 
in putting into words the true intentions of 
their clients. 
- )fargaret Ann Willis 
Allstate Insurance Company '0. Atwood: 
INSURER BOUND BY VERDICT IN 
TORT ACTION AND COULD NOT 
RELITIGATE SAME ISSUES AND 
OBTAIN AN OVERRIDING 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ON 
JURY'S VERDICT 
In Allstate Ins. Co. '0. Atwood, 71 Md. 
App. 107, 523 A.2d 1066 (1987), the Court 
of Special Appeals of Maryland held that a 
tort-feasor's insurer, which provided 
defense for the tort-feasor in an action 
brought by the victim, in which the jury 
determined that the defendant's striking of 
the victim was the result of negligence 
rather than battery, was bound by the ver-
dict even though it was not a party to the 
suit. As a result, the insurer could not seek 
post verdict declaratory relief on the same 
issues of fact which has been decided in the 
tort-feasor's trial. 
This case stems from an incident which 
occured in 1983. In an apparently 
unprovoked attack, the insured, John 
Atwood, struck another youth in the face. 
The suit was brought by the victim, indivi-
dually and through his father, against 
Atwood in the Circuit Court for Mont-
gomery County. The complaint alleged 
that the plaintiff's injuries were the result 
of either Atwood's negligence or inten-
tional assault and battery. 
Atwood, who was living with his 
parents at the time of the incident, relied 
on their policy with Allstate Insurance 
Company. The exclusionary clause pr<r 
vided that the insurer is not liable for 
"bodily injury ... intentionally caused by 
an insured person." Id. at 108, 523 A.2d at 
1067. 
Before the trial, believing Atwood's 
striking of the victim was intentional and 
thereby excluded from coverage, Allstate 
filed for declaratory relief in 1984. The Bill 
was dismissed on the grounds that it was 
premature. 
At the trial, the jury found that Atwood 
was negligent which prevented the defen-
dant's conduct from coming within the 
policy's exclusion regarding intentional 
conduct. Despite the jury's finding of 
negligence, Allstate filed for a Bill of 
Declaratory Relief on the ground that the 
. injuries sustained by the plaintiff "were a 
direct result ... of (Atwood's) intentional 
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